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POSTSECONDARY AND VOCATIONAL EDUCATION 
PROGRAMS AND THE "OTHERWISE QUALIFIED" 
PROVISION OF SECTION 504 OF THE 
REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973 
Marc P. Charmatz* 
Andrew S. Penn** 
Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 1 represents the first 
major civil rights law for this nation's physically and mentally dis-
abled citizens. 2 Congress has realized that handicapped Americans 
have often been denied the benefits and fundamental rights of our 
society .3 With the "complete integration of all individuals with 
handicaps into normal community living, working, and service pc1t-
tei-ns as a final objective,"4 Congress has insisted that handicapped 
persons be assured of equality of opportunity, equal access to all 
aspects of our society, and equal rights. 5 Thus, Title V contains an 
*Litigation Attorney, National Association of the Deaf Legal Defense Fund. B.A., 1969, 
New York University; J.D., 1972, Northwestern University. 
•• Staff Attorney, National Center for Law and the Deaf. B.A., 1974, University of Pennsyl-
vania; J.D., 1977, University of California at Berkeley. 
1 29 U .S.C. §§ 791-794 (1976), as amended by the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, 
Pub. L. No. 93-516, 88 Stat. 1619 (1974) [hereinafter referred to as the 1974 Amendments] and 
the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amendments 
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955 (1978) [hereinaf_ter referred to as the 1978 
Amendments]. 
2 Congressional estimates of the number of handicapped persons vary. See 120 CONG. 
REc. 35,007 (1974) (7 million children, 28 million adults); 119 CoNG. REc. 24,562-63 (1973) (7 
to 12 million); and 119 CONG. REc. 24,442 (1973) (28 to 50 million). In the context of employ-
ment cliscrirriinaiion against handicapped people, Guy, The Developing Law on Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity for the Handicapped: An Overview and Analysis of the Major Issues, 
7 U. BALT. L. REV. 183, 185 (1978), estimates that approximately II million people between 
·the ages of 16 and 64 in the United States may be considered handicapped. The Department 
of Labor places the figure at 20 million. Turney, Defining the Handicapped, 3 DAYTON L. 
REv. 391, 393 n.21 (1978). See also Wolff, Protecting the Disabled Minority: Rights and 
Remedies under Sections 503 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 22 ST. Louis L.J. 
25, 30 nn.28 & 29 (1978); Note, Abroad in the Land: Legal Strategies to Effectuate the 
Rights of the Physically Disabled, 61 GEO. L.J. 1501, 1501 n.2 (1973). 
. 3 See I 19 CONG. REc. 24,566, 24,589 (1973). See also White House Conference on Hand-
icapped Individuals Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516, tit. III, 88 Stat. 1631 (1974), reprinted at 
29 U .S.C.A. § 701 note (West 1975). For an analysis of the earlier efforts to meet the needs of 
this nation's disabled citizens, see Cook, Nondiscrimination in Employment under the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973, 27 AM. U.L. REV. 3·1, 37-41 (1977); O'Donnell, Nondiscrimination 
under Federal Grants -Striving Toward Equal Employment Opportunities for Handicapped 
Individuals. 3 DAYTON L. REV. 405, 405-06 nn.2 & 5 (1978). 
• See White House Conference on Handicapped Individuals Act of 1974, Pub. L. No: 93~ 
516, tit. III, 88 Stat. 1631 (1974). 
• Id. 
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all-encompassing series of antidiscrimination provisions to protect 
disabled citizens. 6 
The most significant and far reaching of Title V's provisions is 
section 504, which states: 
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the 
United States, as defined in Section 706(6) of the Title, 
shall, solely by reason of his handicap be excluded from 
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any programs or activities 
receiving federal financial assistance, or under any pro-
gram or activity conducted by an Executive agency or by 
the U.S. Postal Service .... 7 
Section 504 covers all public and private bodies which receive fed-
eral support as well as federal agencies. 8 For example, within the 
context of secondary education nearly all colleges and universities 
- community, state, and private - receive assistance from the 
federal govemment. 9 Section 504 prohibits employment discrimi-
nation, building inaccessibility, and all forms of discrimination in 
every aspect of a recipient's programs and activities. 10 
The implications and potential impact of section 504 are stagger-
ing. The legislative history suggests that Congress intended section 
504 to be just such a revolutionary law. 11 Moreover, when Con-
6 The four sections of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 require federal agencies, 29 U .S.C. 
§ 791 (1976), federal contractors, id. § 793, and recipients offederal financial assistance, id. § 
794, to take affirmative action to hire and promote qualified handicapped persons, and to 
make federal buildings, programs, and services, id. § 792, accessible to handicapped people. 
7 29 U .S.C. § 794 (1976), as amended by the 1978 Amendments, supra note I. 
8 As originally enacted, § 794 did not apply to the federal government. The 1978 Amend-
ments now apply § 794's broad prohibitions against discrimination to the federal agencies. 
Significant aspects of these Amendments include: 
(I) Codification of the existing practice of applying all rights, remedies, and procedures 
available under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d (1976), to§ 794. 
(2) Application of all rights, remedies, and procedures available under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e (1976), to § 791. 
(3) Authorization of attorneys' fees in suits to enforce any section of Title V of the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973. 1978 Amendments, supra note I, at§ 120. 
• Regional Rehabilitation Research Institute on Attitudinal, Legal, and Leisure Barriers, 
Planning for Implementation of Section 504 at Colleges and Universities 2 (March, 
1978) (unpublished, available at The George Washington University, 1828 L Street, N.W., 
Suite 704, Washington, D.C. 20036). 
10 Section 504 was enacted to prevent discrimination against all handicapped individuals 
in relation to federal assistance in employment, housing, education, health services, or any 
other program. [1974] U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWS 6373, 6388. 
11 The remarks of Senator Humphrey in support of the original version of § 504 express 
this intent: 
I introduce ... a bill ... to insure equal opportunities for the handicapped by pro-
hibiting needless discrimination in programs receiving Federal financial assistance 
.... The time has come when we can no longer tolerate the invisibility of the hand-
icapped in America .... These people have the right to live, to work to the best of 
their ability - to know the dignity to which every human being is entitled .... 
These are people who can and must be helped to help themselves. 
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gress passed section 504, it was aware of the existence of arbitrary 
barriers which have excluded disabled persons from programs or 
activities in the past. 12 By imposing a duty not to discriminate on 
recipients of federal financial assistance. Congress intended them 
to remove those barriers and take into account the capabilities of 
disabled persons. 13 
Section 504, however. contains one important limitation in that it 
only protects "otherwise qualified handicapped individuals." The 
term "handicapped individual" is defined very broadly as any per-
son who: (A) has a physical or mental impairment which substan-
tially limits one or more of such person's major life activities; (B) 
has a record of such impairment; or (C) is regarded as having such 
an impairment. 14 The term "physical or mental impairment" in-
I 18 CoNG. REc. 525 (1972), cited with appro\'lll in Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & 
Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295. 1323 (E.D. Pa. 1977). See also O,·ersight Hearings on Rehabilita-
tion of the Handicapped Programs and the Implementation of Same by Age11cies under the 
Rehahilitatio11 Act of /973: Hearings Bej,,re the Suhcomm. 011 the Handicapped of the 
House Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1502 (1976) (Congress 
intended, in passing the legislation, to bring the force of the federal government to bear in 
remedying discrimination against handicapped persons); Statement of Joseph A. Califano, 
Jr., Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Press Release (Apr. 29, 19n) (on file with 
the Journal of Law Reform) (implementing the unequivocal congressional statute opens a 
new era of civil rights in America). 
12 The Senate Report accompanying the 1974 Amendments recognized that assumptions 
concerning the inability of handicapped persons to participate fully and contribute meaning-
fully to society had "all too often resulted in the violation of their basic rights as human 
beings, and had condemned them to live useless lives." Disabled persons were simply 
"barred from employment or ... underemployed because of archaic attitudes and laws." S. 
REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 50, reprinted in [1974) U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 
6373, 6400. 
1 3 The Senate Report accompanying the 1974 Amendments stated that § 504 "constitutes 
the establishment of a broad government policy that programs receiving Federal financial 
assistance shall be operated without discrimination on the basis of handicap." S. REP. No. 
1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39, reprinted in [1974) U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 
6373,6390. 
14 29 U .s.c. § 706(6) (1976). 
The reason for these three categories is expressed in the Senate Report accompanying the 
1974 Amendments: "The ... definition takes cognizance of the fact that handicapped per-
sons are discriminated against in a number of ways. First, they are discriminated against 
when they are, in fact, handicapped .... Third, they are discriminated against if they are 
regarded as handicapped, regardless of whether they are in fact handicapped." S. REP. No. 
1297, 93d Cong .. 2d Sess. 38, reprinted in [1974) U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 6373, 6389. 
This broad definition of the term "handicapped" was added by Congress in the 1974 
Amendments to the Act. Originally, the term was defined narrowly as follows: 
any individual who (a) has a physical or mental disability which for such individual 
constitutes or results in a substantial handicap to employment, and (b) can rea-
sonably be expected to benefit in terms of employability from vocational rehabilita-
tion services provided pursuant to [Title I and III] of this Act. 
29 U.S.C. § 706(6) (Supp. IV 1974). 
The Congressional Conference Report on the 1974 Amendments explained the need for 
the amendment: 
That [original] definition has proven to be troublesome in its application to provi-
sions of the Act such as Sections 503 and 504 because of its orientation toward em-
ployment and its relation to vocational rehabilitation services. -It was clearly the 
intent of the Congress in adopting Section 503 (affirmative action) and Section 504 
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eludes such conditions as speech, hearing, visual or orthopedic im-
pairments, cerebral palsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, 
cancer, diabetes, heart disease, mental retardation, perceptual 
handicaps, dyslexia, minimal brain disfunctioning, and develop-
mental aphasia. 15 "Major life activities" are not defined in the Act 
or elsewhere, but apparently include walking, seeing, hearing, 
speaking, working, and learning. 16 
While the Rehabilitation Act defines a "handicapped indi-
vidual,'' neither the language of section 504 nor its legislative his-
tory sheds much light on the exact meaning of the term ''otherwise 
qualified handicapped individual.'' 1 7 This article will argue that the 
definition of this term must be broad enough to include severely 
handicapped persons, the primary group that Congress intended to 
benefit and protect in enacting section 504. Focussing on the area 
of postsecondary education, this article will argue that the interpre-
tation developed in the Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare (HEW) Regulation 18 most effectively fulfills the purposes 
which Congress intended in enacting section 504. The article 
examines who is a qualified handicapped student entitled to non-
. discriminatory admission to and participation in college, univer-
sity, and vocational programs. The article also examines the chal-
lenges to affirmative duties placed upon schools which admit hand-
icapped applicants. 
I. THE DEVELOPING INTERPRETATION 
OF "OTHERWISE QUALIFIED" 
A. General Discussion 
HEW did not adopt final regulations implementing section 504 
until May 4, 1977, more than three years after section 504 was 
(non-discrimination) that the term "handicapped individual" in those sections was 
not to be narrowly limited to employment(in the case of 504), nor to the individual's 
potential benefit from vocational rehabilitation services ... (in the case of both 
sections 503 and 504)." 
S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 37, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 
6373, 6388-89. 
1 5 OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS OF U.S. DEPT. OF HEW, SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITA-
TION ACT OF 1973 FACT SHEET: HANDICAPPED PERSON'S RIGHTS UNDER FEDERAL LAWS I 
(1977) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform). 
1 
• Id. at 1-6. 
1 7 There is no explanation in the legislative history of Congress' use of the phrase "other-
wise qualified handicapped individual" in § 504. The HEW regulation promulgated to im-
plement section 504, 45 C.F.R. pt. 84 (1977), uses the term "qualified handicapped person." 
HEW construes "qualified handicapped person" and "otherwise qualified handicapped 
person" synonomously under its regulation. 45 C.F.R. pt. 84 app. A, at 376 (1977). 
18 45 C.F.R. pt. 84 (1977). 
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enacted. 19 Absent HEW regulations, courts developed their own 
interpretations of the term "otherwise qualified." Relying on the 
fact that section 504 proclaims ''a policy of nondiscrimination 
against otherwise qualified handicapped individuals with respect to 
participation in or access to any program which is in receipt of 
Federal financial assistance, " 20 courts began defining "otherwise 
qualified" in terms of the federally assisted activity at issue,21 al-
beit with differing results. 
B. Pre-Regulation Case Law 
1. Postsecondary Education-In Davis v. Southeastern Commun-
ity College, 22 a federal district court held that the failure of a eom-
munity college to admit a hearing-impaired applicant to the col-
lege's nursing program solely because of the applicant's hearing 
loss did not violate section 504.23 The district court noted that Ms. 
1 
• The Senate Report to the 1974 Amendments indicates that Congress saw a need to im-
plement 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. V 1975) through a comprehensive set of regulations. S. REP. 
No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39-40, reprinted in [1974) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 
6373, 6390 (1974). It was not until 1976, however, that the federal government took the first 
steps to begin implementation of § 504 and, thus, shed some light on the term "otherwise 
qualified." On April 28, 1976, President Ford issued Executive Order 11914, requiring each 
federal agency to propose and adopt regulations implementing § 504. 41 Fed. Reg. 17,871 
(1976). Exective Order 11914 authorized HEW and other federal agencies dispensing finan-
cial assistance to adopt rules, regulations, and orders to insure that recipients of federal fi-
nancial aid are in compliance with § 504. HEW was charged with coordinating federal 
agency implementation of§ 504 and with establishing standards to guide the agencies in their 
federal tasks. 
In issuing the regulation to § 504, HEW Secretary Califano noted: 
The 504 Regulation ... reflects the recognition of the Congress that most hand-
icapped persons can lead proud and productive lives, despite their disabilities. It 
will usher in a new era of equality for handicapped individuals in which unfair bar-
riers to self-sufficiency and decent treatment will begin to fall before the force of 
law. 
The 504 Regulation will work fundamental changes in many facets of American 
life. In many cases this regulation calls for dramatic changes in the action and at-
titudes of institutions and individuals who are recipients of HEW funds. In imple-
menting the unequivocal Congressional statute, this regulation opens a new era of 
civil rights in America. 
Statement of Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Secretary of HEW, Press Release (April 29, 1977)(on 
file with the Journal of Law Reform). 
20 S. REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 50, reprinted in [1973) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. 
NEws 2076, 2123. See also Section by Section Analysis of Report, id. at 51, 70, reprinted in 
[1973) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2125, 2143. 
21 Indeed, this is exactly what HEW concluded when it, too, found it necessary to develop 
four different definitions for "qualified handicapped person" in employment; elementary, 
secondary, and adult education; postsecondary education; and health, welfare and social 
services. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(l)-(4) (1977) and notes 39-51 and accompanying text infra. 
22 424 F. Supp. 1341 (E.D.N.C. 1976), affd in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 574 
F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3451 (Jan. 9, 1979)(No. 78-711). 
23 Unlike the other applicants, Ms. Davis was required, as a part of the college selection 
process, to undergo an evaluation of her hearing by an audiologist. Brief in Opposition to 
Petition for Certiorari at 8, Southeastern Community College v. Davis, No. 78-711, cert. 
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Davis was a handicapped person under the statutory definition,24 
but found no violation of section 504, because the court concluded 
that she was not "otherwise qualified" for admission. 25 The dis-
trict court construed "otherwise qualified" to mean "otherwise 
able to function sufficiently in the position sought in spite of the 
handicap .... '' 26 The district court looked beyond Ms. Davis' par-
ticipation in the college nursing program and concluded that Ms. 
Davis' hearing disability would, after graduation, restrict her in the 
pursuit of her proposed profession as a registered nurse. 2 7 In other 
words, the court perceived that Ms. Davis was not "otherwise 
qualified" in part because she might not secure employment as a 
registered nurse after graduation from the nursing program.28 The 
Fourth Circuit reversed the district court decision in Davis after 
HEW issued its Regulation.29 
2. Elementary and Secondary Education-In Hairston v. 
Drosick, 30 a federal court ordered a public school to permit a hand-
icapped child to attend school on the same basis as other chil-
dren. 31 Unlike the district court in Davis, the Hairston court con-
granted, 47 U .S.L. W. 3451 (Jan. 9, 1979) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform). The col-
lege also requested an opinion of the North Carolina Board of Nursing and required that Ms. 
Davis submit letters from potential employers regarding employability following successful 
completion of the college program and licensing by the state. The audiologist reported that, 
with a newly prescribed hearing aid, Ms. Davis' performance was interpreted as satisfactory 
in that the hearing aid improved her hearing to within the outer limits of normal. The State 
Board of Nursing stated that it would not predict eligibility or ineligibility for the registered 
nurse licensing exam "should Ms. Davis enroll in, and be allowed to complete the pro-
gram." Id. at 8-10. Southeastern General Hospital advised the college that they would have 
employed Ms. Davis as a registered nurse if they had a vacancy. Id. at 10-11. Ms. Davis was 
also required to submit a pre-entrance medical record which reflected that although she had 
some deficiency in hearing, she was considered by her examining physician as mentally and 
physically able to undertake the program in nursing. Id. at 7. 
24 29 u .s.c. § 706(6) (1976). 
25 424 F. Supp. at 1345. 
26 Id. 
271d. at 1345-46. Note that the subsequently enacted regulation forbids consideration of 
future compatibility. See 45 C.F.R. § 84. IO(b) (1977), which states that a recipient's obliga-
tion to comply with the regulation is not obviated or alleviated because employment oppor-
tunities in any occupation or profession are or may be more limited for handicapped persons 
than nonhandicapped persons. 
28 In the only other postsecondary education case decided prior to the promulgation of the 
HEW regulation, the court in Borden v. Rohr, No.C2-75-844 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 30, 1975), as 
cited in Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296,300 n.9 (2d Cir. 1977), held that a university's 
refusal to allow a student to play varsity basketball because he had only one eye violated 
§ 504. The subsequently enacted HEW Regulation strongly supports Rohr. See 45 C.F.R. 
§ 84.47(a) (1977). 
29 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3451 (Jan. 9, 1979) (No. 78-
711). See notes 61, 62, 74-76 and accompanying text infra. 
30 423 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. W. Va. 1976). 
31 The court held the following: 
The exclusion of a minimally handicapped child from a regular public classroom 
situation without a bonafide educational reason is in violation of Title V of Public 
Law 93-112, ''The Rehabilitation Act of 1973,'' 29 U .S.C. § 794. The federal statute 
prohibits discrimination against handicapped individuals in any program receiving 
federal financial assistance. To deny to a handicapped child access to a regular pub-
FALL 1978) 1973 Rehabilitation Act 73 
eluded that school age children under section 504 cannot be de-
prived of educational opportunity because of their handicaps. 32 
Implicit in Hairston is the notion that a handicapped child is 
"otherwise qualified" to receive a free appropriate public school 
education if the handicapped child is of the same age at which 
non-handicapped children are eligible for public school educa-
tion.33 
3. Employment-In Duran v. City of Tampa, 34 a police depart-
ment had advised an applicant for a policeman's job that his past 
history of epilepsy automatically excluded him from consideration. 
Although the court denied preliminary relief to the applicant be-
cause of his failure to show irreparable injury, the court noted that 
lie school classroom in receipt of federal financial assistance without compelling 
educational justification constitutes discrimination and a denial of the benefits of 
such program in violation of the statute. 
Id. at 184 (emphasis added). 
32 See also Rhode Island Soc'y for Autistic Children v. Board of Regents, C.A. No. 5081 
(D.R.I. Aug. I, 1975) (on file with the Journal o/Law Reform), where the court states: "[T]he 
clear language of the statute ... [and] the broad definition of handicapped individual and the 
lack of any limiting language in sec. [504) inilicates, contrary to defendants' analysis, that 
the statute should be applied to correct discriminatory practices in any federally assisted 
program." Id. at 7-8. But see Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977), where the 
court held that the exclusion of a one-eyed student from varsity athletics was not improper if 
the school had a substantial justification for its policy. "Section 504 prohibits only the exclu-
sion of handicapped persons who are 'otherwise qualified.' Here, the defendants have relied 
on medical opinion [that] to play in contact sports [created] a high risk of eye injury." Id. at 
299. Kampmeier distinguished Rohr by stating that in Rohr the student was old enough to 
weigh the risks and make the decision himself. Id. at 300. For a comparison of the district 
court decision in Davis with the appellate court opinion in Kampmeier, see Miller,§ 504 and 
the HEW Regulations: Effectuating the Rights of the Handicapped, 5 OHIO N.U.L. R.Ev. 
107, 117-18 (1978). The author concludes that the Davis district court interpretation is the 
more appropriate interpretation in light of the intent of the statute. This analysis was made 
prior to the appellate court decision in Davis. In addition, the author did not have the benefit 
of HEW Policy Interpretation No. 5 (Participation of Handicapped Students in Contact 
Sports): "The exclusion from contact sports of students who have lost an organ, limb, or an 
appendage ... but who are otherwise qualified is a denial of equal opportunity. It denies 
participation not on the basis of ability but because of handicap." U.S. Dept. HEW, Non-
discrimination in Federally Assisted Programs, 43 Fed. Reg. 36,034, 36,035 (1978). See 45 
C.F.R. § 84.37(c)(l)(l978). The HEW interpretation, thus, contradicts the holding in 
Kampmeier. 
33 The court's reasoning in Hairston comports with the subsequently enacted HEW Regu-
lation. HEW recognizes that its Regulation conforms to the standards established for the 
education of handicapped persons in Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 
1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 334 F. Supp. 1257 
(E.D. Pa. 1971), 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972); and Lebanks v. Spears, 60 F.R.D. 135 
(E.D. La. 1973), as well as the Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 
(1970), as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975), in that these cases and the 
HEW Regulation require: (I) that handicapped persons, regardless of the nature or severity 
of their handicap be provided with a free appropriate public education, and (2) that hand-
icapped students be educated, to the maximum extent appropriate to their needs, with non-
handicapped students. 45 C.F.R. pt. 84 app. A, at 384 (1977). 
34 430 F. Supp. 75 (M.D. Fla. 1977). On June 15, 1978, the court ruled that the Tampa 
police could not deny employment to an individual with a history of epilepsy solely because 
of his former condition (Case No. 76-683) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform). Duran is 
in accord with the subsequently enacted HEW Regulation in that there was no evidence.that 
Duran could not' perform the essential functions of the job. See Part II infra. 
74 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 12:1 
the applicant's section 504 claim was meritorious because he was 
"otherwise qualified. " 35 
The court reasoned that it was in the public interest to "ferret 
out discrimination against individuals whose past handicap [sic] 
continue to effect their present ability to find and retain employ-
ment. The clearly enunciated purpose of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973 is to 'promote and expand employment opportunities in the 
public and private sectors for handicapped individuals ... in em-
ployment. '"36 Finally, the Duran court noted that it was also in the 
public interest that all individuals capable of performing a particu-
lar task be placed on an equal footing in acquiring such positions, 
and that society was "diminished when the valuable contributions 
of such individuals are not put to good use. " 37 
These differing court definitions of the term ''otherwise qual-
ified" provide part of the background to the HEW decision to de-
fine ''qualified handicapped person'' in four different ways depend-
ing upon the type of federally assisted program at issue. The HEW 
section 504 Regulation, if followed by the courts, would cure con-
flicting court interpretations and provide the necessary guidance to 
educators and employers as well as the courts.38 
3 • 430 F. Supp. at 78. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 79. See also Gurmankin v. Castanzo, 411 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Pa. 1976), affd, 556 
F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977), in which a blind woman alleged discriminatory hiring practices in the 
Philadelphia public schools. Although the district court based its decision on constitutional 
grounds, the court noted that the refusal to hire a blind teacher was 
the kind of discrimination which that section was meant to prohibit. A blind person 
certainly is a "handicapped individual" as defined in the Act .... A strong argu-
ment also can be made that the school district's testing procedures violated section 
504 .... Although that section protects only "otherwise qualified" handicapped 
individuals, whether Ms. Gurmankin meets that requirement clearly requires a 
nondiscriminatory evaluation of her competency. In this regard the special prob-
lems encountered by blind teachers certainly must be considered, but. .. Ms. 
Gurmankin's blindness does not automatically prevent her from being "otherwise 
qualified." 
Id. at 992. In Gurmankin, the court noted that § 504 was not dispositive of the issues because 
most of the discriminatory acts had taken place prior to the enactment of the law in 1973. Id. 
at 989. See also Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1977), 
where an epileptic was denied employment on the basis of her handicap, despite her claim 
that she was a qualified lab technician. The court in Drennon required plaintiff to exhaust 
her administrative remedies with the Department of Labor. 
38 "The administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency is entitled to great 
deference." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971). See also Udall v. 
Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,431, (1974). 
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II. HEW REGULATION: DEFINITION OF "QUALIFIED 
HANDICAPPED PERSON" 
A. General Discussion 
75 
Because of the diversity of types of handicaps, as well as the 
wide variety of settings in which programs financed by HEW are 
offered, 39 HEW recognized the need to define "qualified hand-
icapped person " 40 in four ways, depending upon the type of feder-
ally assisted program at issue - (1) employment;41 (2) preschool, 
secondary, and adult education;42 (3) postsecondary education;43 
and (4) program accessibility and health, education, welfare, an!l 
social services.44 This comports with the overall structure of the 
Regulation, which is divided into similar subparts in order to deal 
effectively with the unique discriminatory problems faced in each 
federally assisted program. 45 
The congressional purpose of complete integration of all hand-
39 42 Fed. Reg. 22,676 (1977). 
40 HEW construes the term "qualified" and "otherwise qualified" synonymously under 
the Regulation. 45 C.F.R. pt. 84 app. A, at 376 (1977). See also Davis v. Southeastern Com-
munity College, 574 F.2d 1158, 1161 n.7 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 47 U .S.L. W. 3451 (Jan. 
9, 1979) (No. 78-711). 
41 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(l) (1977). 
42 Id. § 84.3(k)(2). 
43 Id. § 84.3(k)(3). 
44 Id. § 84.3(k)(4). Although the same definition of "qualified handicapped person" is 
used for program accessibility and other services, program accessibility is covered in Sub-
part C, id. §§ 84.21-.23, while the other services are covered in Subpart F, id. §§ 84.51-.54. 
See note 45 infra. 
Other federal agencies also define qualified handicapped person in terms of the type of 
federally assisted program at issue. See, e.g., the § 501 Civil Service Commission regulation 
which prohibits discrimination in federal employment, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,295 (1978) (to be 
codified as 5 C.F.R. § 713.702 (f)). A qualified handicapped person is there defined as: 
with respect to employment, a handicapped person who, with or without reason-
able accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the position in ques-
tion without endangering the health and safety of the individual or others and who, 
depending upon the type of appointing authority being used: (I) meets the experi-
ence and/or educational requirements (which may include passing a written test) of 
the position in question, or (2) meets the criteria for appointment under one of the 
special appointing authorities for handicapped persons. 
Id. HEW, as part of its responsibility to coordinate federal agency enforcement of§ 504, 
defines qualified handicapped persori as, "[w]ith respect to employment, a handicapped 
person who, with reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the job 
.. iri.question," 45 C.F .R. § 84.3(k)(I) (1977); "[w]ilth respect to other services, a handicapped 
person who meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of such services." 45 
C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(4) (1977). HUD has adopted this definition in its proposed rules. 43 Fed. 
Reg. 16,650, 16,657 (1978). One commentator has noted that "qualified handicapped person" 
should be interpreted differently when applied in the context of federally financed education 
programs as compared to employment. See Guy, supra note 2. 
45 The Regulation is divided into the following Subparts: (I) program accessibility, 45 
C.F.R. §§ 84.21-.23 (1977); (2) employment practices, 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.11-.14 (1977); (3) pre-
school, elementary, and secondary education, 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.31-.39 (1977); (4) postsecon-
dary education, 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.41-.47 (1977); and (5) health, welfare, and social services, 45 
C.F.R. §§ 84.51-.54 (1977). 
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icapped individuals into normal community living, working, and 
service pattems46 could not have been realized had HEW defined 
"qualified handicapped person" in only one way. The same defini-
tion of "qualified handicapped person" for all the different pro-
grams and activities funded by HEW would not make any practical 
sense. A handicapped person who is "qualified" for social service 
benefits47 may not be "qualified" for a particular job. Conversely, 
a handicapped person who is "qualified" for and employed at a 
particular job48 would not be "qualified" for social service ben-
efits, such as food stamps. 
It also would be counterproductive to define ''qualified hand-
icapped person'' in the same way for postsecondary education49 as 
for employment. A handicapped person may not be qualified for a 
particular job until after that person has been educated in certain 
skills. 50 While an employer has a valid interest in hiring qualified 
persons, exclusion of handicapped applicants from admission to 
colleges and universities impedes rather than promotes this inter-
est. By defining "qualified handicapped person" differently in the 
context of postsecondary education and employment, HEW 
sought to avoid the cause and effect relationship in which discrimi-
nation in education perpetuates unemployment and underemploy-
ment of handicapped persons. Therefore, the definition of "qual-
ified handicapped person" with respect to postsecondary educa-
tion focusses on the handicapped person's academic and technical 
qualifications and not on whether the handicapped person can per-
form the essential functions of a particular job. 
Thus, there are practical and policy justifications for HEW to de-
fine "qualified handicapped person" in four different ways. All 
four definitions are, however, broad enough to achieve the con-
•• See White House Conference on Handicapped Individuals Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 
93-516, 88 Stat. 1631 (1974). 
47 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(4) (1977). A "qualified handicapped person" means "[w]ith respect 
to other services, a handicapped person who meets the essential eligibility requirements for 
the receipt of such services." 
•• 45 C.F.R § 84.3(k)(I) (1977). A "qualified handicapped person" means "[w]ith respect 
to employment, a handicapped person who, with reasonable accommodation, can perform 
the essential functions of the job in question." 
•• 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(3) (1977). A "qualified handicapped person" means "[w]ith respect 
to postsecondary and vocational education services, a handicapped person who meets the 
academic and technical standards requisite to admission or participation in the recipient's 
education program or activity." 
•° For example, there are obviously different qualifications required for a law school ap-
plicant than for a person applying for a position as a lawyer. Indeed, a law school degree is 
one prerequisite to obtaining employment as a lawyer. A law school would not condition its 
acceptance of an applicant upon the applicant's assurance of future employment because no 
law firm would provide the applicant with that assurance prior to entering law school. 
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gressional goal of complete integration of all handicapped per-
sons.51 
B. Postsecondary Education - Definition of 
"Qualified Handicapped Person" 
Subpart E of the HEW Regulation52 contains guidelines for ad-
mitting handicapped students into postsecondary education pro-
grams. A major thrust of Subpart Eis to eliminate handicap as an 
admission criterion. In general, a qualified handicapped person 
may not, on the basis of handicap, be denied admission or be sub-
jected to discrimination in admission or recruitment. 53 Specifically, 
under the Regulation, a postsecondary educational institution may 
not limit the number of handicapped students to be admitted to its 
programs,54 may not use any tests or criteria for admission that 
have a disproportionately adverse effect on handicapped per-
sons,55 and may not inquire as to whether any applicant is hand-
icapped.56 Instead, the relevant definition of "qualified handi-
51 See White House Conference on Handicapped Individuals Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 
93-516, 88 Stat. 1631 (1974). The Senate Report states that the following persons are entitled 
to the protections of Title V: "physically or mentally handicapped children who may be de-
nied admission to Federally-supported school systems on the basis of their handicap ... and 
those persons whose vocational rehabilitation is complete but who may nevertheless be dis-
criminated against in certain Federally-assisted activities." S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 38, reprinted in [1974) U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWS 6373, 6389. The Senate Report 
also states that the language of the statute cannot be "fulfilled by the expediency of hiring or 
limiting services to persons marginally or previously handicapped." Id. at 39, [1974) U.S. 
CoDE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6390. See Note, Affirmative Action Toward Hiring Qualified 
Handicapped Individuals, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 785 (1976). This author concludes that the 
"use of the adjective 'qualified' in conjunction with the mandate [to end discrimination] 
should not reduce the involved minority to those handicapped individuals with no physical 
or mental barriers .... Indeed, such a reduced minority would include only those hand-
icapped individuals who have least need for assistance." Id. at 807-08. 
52 Subpart E applies to postsecondary education programs and activities, including post-
secondary vocational educational programs and activities, that receive or benefit from fed-
eral financial assistance. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.41-.47 (1977). 
53 A recent HEW report emphasized that "[t]he premise underlying this subsection of the 
Regulation is that an applicant's handicap is not relevant with respect to admission or re-
cruitment. The recipient must establish and apply policies which do not take into account 
the existence of a person's handicap." Office of the Secretary of the Department of HEW, 
Section 504 Policy Problems Encountered During Onsite Compliance Reviews 14 (Sept. 29, 
1978) (memorandum on file with the Journal of Law Reform). 
54 45 C.F.R. § 84.42(b)(I) (1977). 
55 Id. § 84.42(b)(2). 
56 Id.§ 84.42(b)(4). There is one exception, however. "When the recipient is taking reme-
dial action to correct the effects of past discrimination ... or ... taking voluntary action to 
overcome the effects of conditions that resulted in limited participation in its federally as-
sisted program ... , the recipient may invite applicants for admission to indicate whether 
and to what extent they are handicapped." 45 C.F.R. § 84.42(c) (1977). Compare this 
preadmission inquiry exception with 45 C.F.R. § 84.14 (1977) regarding pre-employment in-
quiries. While pre-employment inquiries are generally limited, an employer may make pre-
employment inquiry as to an applicant's ability to perform job related tasks. This narrow 
area of inquiry in the employment context is not applicable to postsecondary education. 
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capped person" requires that postsecondary educational institu-
tions look only to an individual's academic and technical qualifica-
tions to determine whether the individual is qualified. 57 
The HEW prohibition of preadmission inquiry can be an effec-
tive way of preventing covert discrimination. For example, it may 
be tempting for a school with financial pressures or a limited 
budget to reject a known handicapped applicant, and falsely state 
that the applicant was unqualified, thereby avoiding the costs of 
any auxiliary aid or other affirmative obligation. 58 Stereotyped 
misconceptions and prejudices about the abilities of a known hand-
icapped applicant also could be the unstated reason for rejection, 
despite academic qualifications. 59 
The ban on preadmission inquiry precludes such discrimination 
and assures the applicant that his or her handicap will not be con-
sidered by the school in its admission decision. The ban on pread-
mission inquiry also avoids the chilling effect on the many potential 
applicants who are reluctant to apply for admission for fear that 
they must disclose their handicaps while seeking admission. The 
Regulation delays any inquiry into an applicant's disability until 
after the applicant has been found qualified. 60 Thus, the Regula-
tion's definition of "qualified handicapped person" for 
postsecondary education plays a crucial part in assuring a nondis-
criminatory admission procedure. This definition works in tandem 
with the ban on preadmission inquiry to force schools to consider 
an applicant's academic and technical qualifications, not his or her 
handicap. These provisions comport closely with an expansive 
reading of the statutory term "otherwise qualified handicapped in-
dividual." 
C. Academic and Technical Standards 
The HEW Regulation does not establish guidelines on the 
specific types of academic and technical standards a school may 
set. However, in the first case testing the Regulation, the appeal of 
57 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(3) (1977). The term "technical standards" refers to all 
nonacademic admissions criteria that are essential to participation in the postsecondary 
education program. 45 C.F.R. pt. 34 app. A, at 377 (1977). 
58 See Part HT A infra. · 
59 See Cook, supra note 3, at 35-36: "Although architectural barriers play an important 
role in restricting employment possibilities [for handicapped people], the most important 
single barrier lies in employer attitudes. Qualified job applicants or employees are often re-
jected for positions or promotions solely because of the presence of a disability." See also 
Lang, Employment Rights of the Handicapped, II CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 703, 703 nn.3-4 
(1977). 
• 0 See Part III A infra. 
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Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 61 the Fourth Circuit 
addressed the question of requirements by stating that a college 
may use only the same objective and subjective factors it used to 
evaluate other, presumably nonhandicapped, applicants for admis-
sion. 62 Specifically, the court held that the college could not con-
sider the applicant's hearing impairment in deciding whether or not 
to admit her to a nursing program. 
Southeastern Community College argued, however, that a 
school should be able to consider the nature of an applicant's hand-
icap, and then decide whether the applicant is qualified to function 
in the education program' 'in spite of' that handicap. 63 Support for 
this argument is found, not in any section of the Regulation, but in 
the HEW analysis accompanying the Regulation. The analysis ex-
plains that the Regulation uses the term ''qualified handicapped 
person" instead of the statutory term "otherwise qualified hand-
icapped person" because, "read literally, 'otherwise' qualified 
handicapped persons include persons who are qualified except for 
their handicap. Under such a literal reading, a blind person posses-
sing all the qualifications for driving a bus except sight could be 
said to be 'otherwise qualified' for the job of driving. " 64 As pre-
sented in the HEW analysis, the blind bus driver example has rele-
vance only in the context of the Regulation's definition of "qual-
ified handicapped person" for employment and provides justifica-
tion for the limited pre-employment inquiry allowed under the 
Regulation. 65 To ascertain whether a person is qualified for a job, 
the Regulation permits employers to make limited pre-employment 
inquiries into an applicant's ability to perform essential,job-related 
functions. 66 However, direct pre-employment inquiries about an 
applicant's handicap are still prohibited.67 
To use HEW's blind bus driver example to justify pre-
61 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 47 U .S.L.W. 3451 (Jan. 9, 1979) (No. 78-
711). 
62 574 F.2d at ll(i(). 
63 See Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 424 F. Supp. 1341, 1345 (E.D.N.C. 
1976), affd in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 574 F.2d 1158, 1161 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. 
granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3451 (Jan. 9, 1979) (No. 78-711). See also Southeastern Community 
College Petition for Certiorari in Davis, id. (on file at the Journal of Law Reform). 
64 45 C.F.R. pt. 84 app. A, at 376 (1977). 
6
' 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(I) (1977). See also Guy, supra note 2, at 245-47. 
66 45 C.F.R. § 84.14 (1977). 
67 45 C.F.R. pt. 84 app. A, at 381 (1977). For example, although an employer cannot ask 
whether a person applying to be a bus driver is visually impaired, the regulation does permit 
the employer to ask whether the applicant can drive a bus, if that is a necessary qualification 
for the job. Thus, the hiring process must be nondiscriminatory, for as the court in Gurman-
kin noted, "[m]erely requiring blind persons to be considered for teaching positions will be a 
meaningless gesture if such applicants are not evaluated fairly." Gurmankin v. Castanzo, 
411 F. Supp. 982,992 (E.D. Pa. 1976), affd, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977). In Gurmankin, the 
defendant was found to lack information on the capabilities of blind teachers and the kinds of 
adjustments that blind teachers would make to overcome apparent problems. 
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admissions inquiry by schools is misleading and inconsistent with 
the provisions of the Regulation. In the postsecondary education 
context, the Regulation prohibits any consideration of an appli-
cant's handicap in determining the applicant's qualifications for 
admission. 68 An evaluation of the applicant's academic and techni-
cal qualifications is the only permissible inquiry. 
The "in spite of'' argument is also inconsistent with the Regula-
tion section on academic adjustments. If a college or university 
need only consider whether a handicapped applicant is qualified in 
spite of his or her ability, that college or university would not have 
to make the academic adjustments required by section 84.44 of the 
HEW Regulation. 69 A handicapped applicant who is qualified in 
spite of his or her disability requires few, if any, academic adjust-
ments; this section of the Regulation would become a nullity if this 
interpretation of "otherwise qualified" were adopted. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, an "in spite of'' defini-
tion of "qualified handicapped person" would frustrate the con-
gressional goal of "complete integration" of all handicapped per-
sons into our society. 7° This narrow definition would protect only 
minimally handicapped persons, not the severely handicapped per-
sons whom the Act was intended to benefit. 7 1 Title V was enacted 
against a background of extensive discrimination against all hand-
icapped persons. 72 A definition which reduces the number of hand-
icapped persons to those least in need of the Act's protections does 
68 See notes 41-43 and accompanying text supra. A college cannot, on the one hand, re-
frain from inquiring about a person's disability prior to admission, as required by 45 C.F.R. 
§ 84.42(b)(4) (1977), and, at the same time, inquire about the nature ofa person's disability in 
evaluating academic and technical standards. 
· •• 45 C.F.R. § 84.44 (1977). 
70 See note 51 and accompanying text supra. For a contrary view, see Miller, supra note 
32, who argues: "It is more consistent with the statute to recognize an interpretation which 
means basically that in spite of a person's handicap, he is in other respects still qualified to 
participate in a program or activity and should not be denied the participation solely on the 
basis of his handicap." Id. at 118. 
11 See note 51 supra. 
In the context of employment discrimination against "qualified handicapped persons," 
one commentator has pointed out that "if Congress intended to require contractors to take 
affirmative action only with respect to those handicapped individuals who need no accom-
modation, then handicap affirmative action assumes a purely remedial aspect similar to that 
in the race context; in that case any reasonable accommodation requirement would be inap-
propriate." Note, Affirmative Action Toward Hiring Qualified Handicapped Individuals, 
supra note 51, at 805. The commentator adds, "In other words, affirmative action would 
respond only to employer attitude problems and not to physical or mental limitations, which 
constitute the distinctive minority characteristic in the handicap context." The com-
mentator concludes that Congress did not intend that the number of handicapped individuals 
protected against discrimination be so narrowly limited. Id. at 807 n.97. 
72 See Note, Abroad in the Land, supra note 2. See also Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A History 
of Unequal Treatment: the Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a Suspect Class 
Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 855 (1975). 
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not meet the congressional mandate to end discrimination. 73 
The Fourth Circuit in Davis followed the Regulation in rejecting 
the "in spite of" argument. The college was required to reconsider 
Ms. Davis' qualifications "without regard to her hearing disabil-
ity. " 74 Although the court did little more than reverse the trial 
court on this issue, 75 this case represents important judicial sup-
port for the goal of nondiscrimination in federally funded pro-
grams. 76 
Ill. AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF 
A. Requirements in the HEW Regulation 
The Regulation definition of "qualified handicapped person" in 
the postsecondary education context precludes any consideration 
of the applicant's handicap in the admission evaluation process. 
Only after the applicant has been admitted can the school inquire 
as to the nature of the applicant's handicap, and only for the pur-
pose of determining the necessary program modifications the 
school must make to accommodate the student's disability. The 
college's duty to modify its program is one of many substantial af-
firmative obligations which the Regulation imposes upon recipients 
in order to effect the statute's purpose of nondiscrimination. The 
Regulation recognized that often handicapped persons are not pro-
vided an equal opportunity merely by providing them with the 
same facilities, the same programs, and the same teachers provided 
to nonhandicapped persons. Thus, the Regulation requires reci-
pients to provide special services to ensure that handicapped per-
73 HEW "intends ... to give particular attention in its enforcement of section 504 to 
eliminating discrimination against persons with the severe handicaps that were the focus of 
concern in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.'" 45 C.F.R. pt. 84 app. A, at 375 (1977). 
74 574 F.2d at 1160. 
75 The appellate court did not order Ms. Davis" admission into the college of nursing pro-
gram, and did not express any opinion on the scholastic suitability of Ms. Davis to pursue 
her studies toward a registered nurse license. The court noted that the "application and in-
terpretation of HEW regulations lie. in the first instance, with the district court.'" Id. at I 162 
n.8. The court did not wish to expand upon the regulations, their reasonableness, or their 
scope, absent a more fully developed record. Id. at 1161-62 n.7a. 
76 This case has drawn widespread attention. An amicus brief in support of Southeastern 
Community College's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit was filed by the American Council on Education (representing 1,291 
nonprofit institutions of higher education and 169 national and regional educational associa-
tions and organizations) on behalf of itself and the Commonwealths of Massachusetts, 
Pennsylvania, and Virginia, and the States of Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, 
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Washington, and West Virginia. The Petition for Certiorari was 
granted by the Supreme Court on January 8, 1979, 45 U.S.L.W. 3451 (Jan. 9, 1979) (No. 
78-711). 
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sons receive equally effective benefits and treatment. 77 
The Regulation imposes specific affirmative duties upon recipi-
ents depending on the type of program they operate. In the context 
of postsecondary education, the Regulation requires colleges and 
universities to modify discriminatory academic course require-
ments. 78 Modifications include changes in the length of time per-
mitted to complete degree requirements, substitution of specific 
courses, and adaptation of the manner in which specific courses 
are conducted. 79 The Regulation further requires colleges and uni-
versities to provide auxiliary learning aids for students with im-
paired sensory, manual, or speaking skills. 110 Auxiliary aids include 
qualified sign language interpreters or other effective means of 
making orally delivered materials available to students with im-
paired hearing, readers for blind students, and classroom equip-
ment adapted for use by students with manual impairments.81 The 
affirmative duty provisions of the Regulation have been challenged 
on several grounds which will be discussed in the following sec-
tion. 
B. Challenges to the Regulation 
J. Statutory Authority for Affirmative Duty- Affirmative obliga-
tion requirements are specified throughout the Regulation. 82 In at-
77 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.4(b)(l)(iii), .4(b)(2) (1977). The HEW analysis of the Regulation explains 
that: 
In this context, the term "equally effective" ... is intended to encompass the 
concept of equivalent, as opposed to identical, services and to acknowledge the 
fact that, in order to meet the individual needs of handicapped persons to the same 
extent that the corresponding needs of nonhandicapped persons are met, adjust-
ments to regular programs or the provision of different programs may sometimes be 
necessary. For example, a welfare office that uses the telephone for communicat-
ing with its clients must provide alternative modes of communicating with its deaf 
clients. 
45 C.F.R. pt. 84 app. A. at 377 (1977). 
78 45 C.F.R. §84.44(a) (1977). Academic requirements that the recipient can demonstrate 
are essential to the program of instruction or to any directly related licensing requirement 
need not be changed. Id. It is significant to note that the defendant college in Davis was not 
prepared and could not act to make any program modifications to accommodate Ms. Davis' 
hearing impairment. Davis, 574 F.2d at l 162. 
79 45 C.F.R. § 84.44(a) (1977). 
80 Id. § 84.44(d)(l). 
81 Id. § 84.44(d)(2). Pursuant to§ 84.44(d), several courts have ordered colleges to pay for 
interpreters for their deaf students' classes. See Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 
635, 639(D.S.C. 1977); Crawford v. University of N. C., 440 F. Supp. 1047, 1059 (M.D. N.C. 
1977); Camenisch v. University of Tex., No. A-78-CA-961 (W.D. Tex. May 17, 1978), appeal 
filed, 5th Cir. May 17, 1978 (copy of notice of appeal on file with the Journal of Law Re-
form); Herbold v. Trustees of Cal. State Univs. and Colleges, C-78-1358 RHS (N.D. Cal. 
July 17, 1978). 
82 See 45 C.F.R. § 84.6(a) (1977) (remedial action required of aU recipients to overcome 
the effects of discrimination); 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.31-.37 (1977) (duty of public elementary and 
secondary schools to provide free, appropriate public education to all handicapped chil-
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tacking the validity of these requirements some recipients of fed-
eral monies have argued that the affirmative duty regulations far 
exceed the in tended scope of section 504. 83 According to this ar-
gument, the language of section 504, unlike its counterpart section 
503, contains no affirmative action obligation. The statutory lan-
guage mandates only a negative duty not to discriminate. 
An examination of the statute and its legislative and judicial in-
terpretation indicates this statutory interpretation is invalid. The 
Senate Report accompanying the 1974 Amendments to the Re-
habilitation Act expressly states that "[w]here applicable, section 
504 is intended to include a requirement of affirmative action as 
well as a prohibition against discrimination. " 84 The Senate Report 
further recognizes that section 504 rights, remedies, and proce-
dures are intended to closely parallel those available under Title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,85 which requires affirmative relief to 
prevent discrimination against students who do not speak English 
as their native language. In Lau v. Nichols ,86 which held that such 
dren); 45 C.F.R. § 84.52(c) (Im) (hospital's duty to establish procedure for effective com-
munications with deaf patients in emergency health care situations); 45 C.F.R. § 84.52(d) 
(1977) (duty of health, welfare and social service agencies with 15 or more employees to pro-
vide appropriate auxiliary aids to persons with impaired sensory, manual or speaking skills); 
45 C.F.R. §§ 84.21-.23 (1977) (duty of all recipients to make their programs and facilities 
readily accessible to and usable by handicapped persons); 45 C.F.R. § 84.12 (1977) (em-
ployers' duty to make "reasonable accommodations" for the physical and mental limita-
tions of qualified handicapped employees and applicants.) 
83 See Brooks, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Private College: 
Barnes v. Converse College, 29 MERCER L. REV. 745, 757 (1978). The author contends that 
because the HEW regulations were not issued pursuant to an express statutory delegation of 
authority, they are entitled to less weight and subject to stricter judicial scrutiny. Id. at 756-
57. See also General Elec. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1977). However, with the passage of 
the 1978 Amendments, supra note l, there is now express statutory authority for promulga-
tion of regulations. Section 505(a)(l) of the 1978 Amendments makes the rights, remedies, 
and procedures available under Title VI equally applicable to§ 504. Title VI also contains an 
express statutory delegation of authority for promulgation of regulations. See note 8 supra. 
Some have also tried to argue that Congress neither expressly nor impliedly ever intended 
for any regulations to be promulgated under§ 504. This is clearly erroneous, as the Senate 
Report on the 1974 Amendments to the Act explains: "[Section 504] does not specifically 
require the issuance of regulations or expressly provide for enforcement procedures, but it is 
clearly mandatory in form, and such regulations and enforcement are intended." S. REP. 
No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39-40, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 
6373, 6390. See also S. REP. No. 1139, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 1457, 
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 27-28 (1974). Not only were regulations intended by Congress and issued 
pursuant to Executive Order 11914, 41 Fed. Reg. 17,871 (1976), but they were also ordered by 
a federal district court in Cherry v. Mathews, 419 F. Supp. 922 (D.D.C. 1976). Stating that 
§ 504 was not intended to be self-enforcing, the judge in Cherry ordered the Secretary of 
HEW to promulgate regulations without further delay. 419 F. Supp. at 924. 
84S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. 
NEWS 6373, 6390. Courts have long adhered to the principle that "[s]ubsequent legislation 
declaring the intent of an earlier statute is entitled to great weight in statutory construction." 
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-81 (1969) (footnote omitted). See also 
FHA v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 90 (1958); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530,541 
(1962); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978). 
85 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). 
86 414 u .s. 563 (1974). 
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relief was required, the Supreme Court said, "[t]here is no equality 
of treatment merely by providing students with the same facilities, 
textbooks, teachers, and curriculum; for students who do not un-
derstand English are effectively foreclosed from any meaningful 
education. " 87 One circuit court, noting the parallels between Title 
VI and the Rehabilitation Act, paraphrased the quoted passage 
from Lau in requiring that public transportation facilities be made 
accessible to handicapped people. 88 
The 1978 Amendments to the Rehabilitation Act expressly codify 
the parallel to Title Vl.89 By this time the HEW Regulation had 
been issued, and nothing in the 1978 Amendments overrules the 
Regulation. Congressional failure to revise or repeal an agency in-
terpretation has long been recognized as indicative of congres-
sional acquiescence in the agency interpretation. 90 
2. Costs as a Defense Excusing the Duty to Provide Affirmative 
Relief - One problem of particular concern to recipients is the po-
tentially burdensome effect of the costs required to meet the affir-
mative obligations imposed by section 504.91 Within the contexts 
of education, program accessibility, and social and health services, 
the Regulation contains no provision recognizing costs as a de-
87 Id. at 566. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart explained that "[t]he Department 
[of HEW] has reasonably and consistently interpreted § 601 to require affirmative remedial 
efforts to give special attention to linguistically deprived children." Id. at 571. The Court 
also specificaUy upheld the power of Congress to attach antidiscrimination and affirmative 
relief conditions to the granting of federal funds. "Whatever may be the limits of that power 
[to attach conditions] ... they have not been reached here .... 'Simple justice requires 
that public funds, to which all taxpayers of all races contribute, not be spent in any fashion 
which encourages, entrenches, subsidizes, or results in racial discrimination."' Id. at 569 
(quoting remarks of Sen. Humphrey, 110 CONG. REC. 6543 (1964)). 
88 Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277, 1284 (7th Cir. 1977). See also Davis v. 
Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 47 U .S.L.W. 
3451 (Jan. 9, 1979) (No. 78-711); United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 
1977); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977); 
Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635 (D.S.C. 1977). 
89 See note 8 supra. Legislative intent to require affirmative conduct can be inferred from 
the Congressional Oversight Hearings on Section 504, Report on Implementation of Section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 95th Cong., Isl Sess. (1977), in which the use of an 
assurance form was discussed. The testimony of David Tatel, Director of the HEW Office 
for Civil Rights, reveals that Congress was clearly aware of the affirmative duties imposed 
by the HEW Regulation. Id. at 298, 358, 367. 
The Assurance of Compliance Form used by HEW (sample on file with the Journal of 
Law Reform) has the recipient of federal funds agree to comply with "all requirements im-
posed by the applicable HEW regulation (45 C.F.R. Part 84)," including those requiring af-
firmative conduct. 
9° Commissioner v. Estate of Noel, 380 U.S. 678, 682 (1965); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. I, 
11-12 (1965); NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 365-66 (1951); Norwegian Nitrogen 
Prod. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294,313 (1933); Constanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 U.S. 341, 
345 (1932). 
91 See 45 C.F.R. pt. 84 app. A, at 382-84 (1977). See also O'Neill, Discrimination Against 
Handicapped Persons - The Costs, Benefits and Inflationary Impact of Implementing Sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 Covering Recipients of HEW Financial Assistance, 
41 Fed. Reg. 20,312 (1976). 
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fense. 92 The Fourth Circuit opinion in Davis accepts this interpre-
tation of the statutory intent and finds support in earlier cases for 
"the requirement of affirmative conduct on the part of certain en-
tities under section 504 even when such modifications become ex-
pensive. " 93 Only in the employment context does the regulation 
allow recipients to argue that the costs of accommodating an appli-
cant or employee constitute an undue hardship. However, the re-
cipient bears the burden of proving undue hardship. 94 
By not allowing costs to be a defense in the education context, 
the Regulation arguably might be invalid as not reasonably related 
to the purposes of the statute.95 If Congress did not intend to re-
quire private institutions to expend their own scarce funds to pro-
vide program modifications and accommodations, the Regulation, 
by failing to consider costs, imposes an unreasonably severe bur-
92 In the introductory comments to the Regulation, HEW Secretary Joseph Califano, Jr. 
declares: "Those burdens and costs, to be sure, provide no basis for exemption from section 
504 or this regulation: Congress' mandate to end discrimination is clear." 42 Fed. Reg. 
22,676 (1977). 
In the postsecondary education context, one university tried to argue that it did not have. 
to pay for interpreters for a deaf student's classes because the student was financially able to 
pay for the interpreter himself. The university contended that it never gave financial assis• 
tance to students who did not meet its financial aid eligibility requirements. However, the 
court in Camenisch v. University of Tex., No. A-78-CA-961 (W.D. Tex. May 17, 1978), ap• 
peal filed, 5th Cir. May 17, 1978 (copy of notice of appeal on file with the Journal of Law 
Reform), rejected this argument and issued a preliminary order for the university to pay for 
this auxiliary learning aid, pursuant to 45 C.F.R. § 84.44(d)(l977). It is inappropriate for a 
university to try to shift the obligations imposed by § 504 upon handicapped persons de• 
signed to be protected under the statute. Moreover, the fact that the student does not meet 
the school's financial eligibility requirements is irrelevant to his or her statutory right to an 
interpreter or other auxiliary learning aid. Payment for auxiliary aids is a statutory and con• 
tractual obligation imposed on the university by § 504, the HEW Regulation to § 504, and 
the Assurance of Compliance Form signed by all recipients of federal financial assistance 
(sample form on file with the Journal of Law Reform). 
93 574 F.2d at 1162 (emphasis added), citing United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 
413, 415-16 (8th Cir. 1977) (transit commission must make mass transit facilities accessible to 
all handicapped persons); Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277, 1281-84 (7th Cir. 
1977) (similar holding on similar facts); Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635, 637 
(D.S.C. 1977) (college required to provide interpreter services to a deaf student. "Although 
the danger of future expenditures under this statute is not a proper consideration in this law-
suit, this court is most sympathetic with the plight of defendant as a private institution which 
may well be forced to make substantial expenditures of private monies to accommodate the 
federal government's generosity." Id. at 638); Hairston v. Drosdick, 423 F. Supp. 180, 184 
(S.D. W. Va. 1976) (student with a minor disability must be admitted to the public classroom 
"even at great expense to the school system." Id. at 186). 
•• See 45 C.F.R. § 84. 12(c) (1977): 
In determining ... whether an accommodation would impose an undue hardship 
on the operation of recipient's program, factors to be considered include: 
(I) The overall size of the recipient's program with respect to number of em-
ployees, number and type of facilities, and size of budget; 
(2) The type of the recipient's operation, including the composition and structure 
of the recipient's work force; and 
(3) The nature and cost of the accommodation needed. 
•• See Brooks, supra note 83, at 756-57. 
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den.96 There is evidence that HEW did take costs into account. In 
its introductory comments on the Regulation, HEW assert~ that it 
had carefully evaluated the economic and inflationary impact of the 
Regulation.97 A specific example of cost considerations is found in 
the context of the requirement that postsecondary schools provide 
auxiliary learning aids.98 The HEW analysis of the Regulation indi-
cates that schools can usually meet this obligation by assisting stu-
dents in finding outside help from state vocational rehabilitation 
agencies and private charitable institutions. 99 More importantly, 
studies have indicated that the costs required to provide affirma-
tive relief will not normally impose a severe economic burden on 
recipients. 100 One authoritative analysis concluded that the major 
expense imposed on postsecondary institutions by the HEW Regu-
lation will be the cost of building accessibility. "It is not expected 
that subpart E ... will impose significant additional costs on 
higher education as a whole," 101 because, for many of the 200,000 
handicapped students who would potentially attend such institu-
tions in any given year, simply making the building accessible 
would be the only real expense in ending discrimination. 102 
96 But see discussion of legislative intent to require affirmative relief under§ 504, notes 
84-88 and accompanying text supra. See also Mourning v. Family Publications Serv. Inc., 
411 U.S. 356,371 (1973); Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268,278 (1969). 
97 42 Fed. Reg. 22,676, 22,677 (1977). 
98 45 C.F.R. § 84.44(d) (1977). 
99 45 C.F.R. pt. 84 app. A, at 388-89 (1977). Some schools have tried to argue that this 
portion of the HEW analysis indicates that under 45 C.F.R. § 84.44(d/ (1977), the responsi-
bility to provide auxiliary aids rests with vocational rehabilitation offices and private agen-
cies; the school's only responsibility is to refer handicapped students to these outside 
sources of funds. This argument ignores the express language of 45 C.F.R. § 84.44(d) (1977): 
"A recipient ... shall take such steps as are necessary [to provide auxiliary aids]." While 
the HEW analysis "anticipates" that outside agencies will usually pay for auxiliary aids, 
both the courts and HEW have made it clear that if those outside sources of funds are not 
available, ultimate responsibility to pay for the aids rests with the university. See Davis v. 
Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 47 U .S.L.W. 
3451 (Jan. 9, 1979) (No. 78-711); Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635 (D.S.C. 1977); 
Camenisch v. University of Tex., No. A-78-CA-961 (W.D. Tex. May 17, 1978), appeal filed, 
5th Cir. May 17, 1978 (copy of notice of appeal on file with the Journal of Law Reform); 
Crawford v. University of N.C., 440 F. Supp. 1047 (M.D.N.C. 1977); Herbold v. Trustees of 
the Cal. State Univs. and Colleges, No. C-78-1358 RHS (N.D. Cal. July 17, 1978). See also 45 
C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (19n) (proof of undue hardship can excuse employer's duty to make rea-
sonable accommodation); 45 C.F.R. § 84.52(d)(2)(1977) (health, welfare and social service 
agencies with less than 15 employees are exempt from duty to provide auxiliary aids where 
exemption would not significantly impair the ability of the recipient to provide its benefits or 
services). The HEW analysis of program accessibility requirements states that the program 
accessibility standard is flexible enough to permit recipients to devise ways to make their 
programs accessible short of extremely expensive or impractical physical changes in 
facilities. 45 C.F.R. pt. 84 app. A, at 382-84 (1977). 
100 There are many ways of lessening the economic burden. For example, profit-making 
recipients who make their facilities accessible can take advantage of federal tax deductions. 
I.R.C. § 190. Federal funds are available to public schools under the Education for All Hand-
icapped .Children Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1424 (1976), to pay for the costs of complying with 
Subpart D of the HEW Regulation. 
101 O'Neill, supra note 91, at 20,312. 
102 Id. 
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3. Academic Freedom - Criticism of the Regulation's affirma-
tive relief requirement might also focus on the argument that it 
constitutes undue interference with a university's freedom to de-
cide curriculum content, teaching methodology, hiring practices, 
and admissions policies. As such, the regulation arguably infringes 
upon academic freedom in violation of the first amendment. 1 03 
The courts have recognized the vital role that institutions of 
higher education play in preserving democratic freedoms, 1 04 and 
have been loath to uphold any actions which constitute a threat to 
those freedoms. 105 In identifying the academic contribution to 
democracy which is being protected, the Supreme Court has spo-
ken in terms of safeguarding the right "to inquire, to study and to 
evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding." 106 Moreover, 
the rights of both teachers and students are to be protected. 107 In 
testing the Regulation under the Rehabilitation Act against this 
standard, the essence of academic freedom - the right to freely 
pursue ideas and beliefs - is in no way being challenged. The Reg-
ulation addresses itself only to making the arena where academic 
freedom may be exercised - learning institutions - open to those 
handicapped people previously precluded from it. The Regulation 
does not dictate the content of ideas and beliefs which may be pre-
sented in a classroom by either students or teachers. The Regula-
tion, rather than infringing on academic freedoms, extends the 
exercise of academic freedoms to those previously excluded. 
The courts have long recognized that the discretionary powers of 
1 03 Another constitutional law challenge to the affirmative relief requirements has been 
that they constitute reverse discrimination, in violation of the equal protection clause of the 
fourteenth amendment. See American Council on Educ., Amicus Brief in Support of Peti-
tion for Certiorari in Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 
1978), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3451 (Jan. 9, 1979) (No. 78-711). See also note 76 supra. 
The affirniative obligations imposed by § 504 and the HEW Regulation are distinguishable 
from the admissions quota program struck down by the Supreme Court in Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978), the leading case on reverse discrimination. The 
affirmative relief provisions of§ 504 require schools to make adjustments in academic pro-
grams other than admissions for handicapped students who have met the same admission 
standards required ofnonhandicapped students. It is ironic that the admissions policy which 
the Supreme Court struck down in Bakke used race as a positive admissions criterion, 
whereas the whole thrust of the§ 504 regulation is to eliminate handicap as a negative factor 
in admissions. See note 68 and accompanying text supra. 
Rather than establishing special admissions standards as in Bakke, the affirmative obliga-
tions under§ 504 are imposed only to prevent the situation where "identical treatment ... 
is itself discriminatory." 43 Fed. Reg. 2134 (1978). See discussion of "equally effective" 
treatment at notes 77-78 and accompanying text supra. As one commentator noted, "[t]he 
expenditure of funds to accommodate the needs of disabled employees under Section 504 is 
no more than a function of the non-discrimination requirements of the statute." Cook, supra 
note 3, at 59 n.174. 
10• See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957); Greene v. Howard 
Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609, 615 (D.D.C. 1967). 
10s Id. 
10
• Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957). 
I 07 Id. 
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a university are not absolute. For example, public institutions, in 
carrying out hiring, firing, and disciplinary actions, are bound by 
applicable constitutional limits protecting the individual rights of 
both students and faculty.Ios Moreover, the courts have upheld 
congressional powers to condition receipt offederal funds on com-
pliance with specified conditions, as long as the conditions are con-
stitutional. I 09 As noted above, it is hard to argue that the affirma-
tive relief requirements constitute a first amendment intrusion. In 
Lau, a case with many of the same elements as the Davis case, the 
Supreme Court upheld as within congressional spending power the 
imposition of affirmative relief as a condition for receiving federal 
funds under a statute with a nondiscriminatory purpose. I IO In both 
Davis and Lau, Congress had prohibited discrimination against a 
specific group, and the courts found that effectively equal treat-
ment would only be realized by providing supportive programs 
which enabled the protected group to participate fully in programs 
funded with federal monies. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The HEW Regulation establishes clear guidelines for non-
discriminatory treatment of "otherwise qualified handicapped in-
dividuals." Many institutions of postsecondary education argue 
that they should be allowed to treat handicapped applicants and 
students differently from other students and from the treatment de-
lineated in the Regulation. The forthcoming Supreme Court deci-
sion in Davis should resolve the differences between HEW and 
such institutions. 
Before the Rehabilitation Act became effective, people with se-
vere handicaps were for the most part excluded from many educa-
tional programs and employment opportunities. The legislative his-
tory of the Act shows a concern for helping more than the mini-
mally handicapped for whom little, if any, academic adjustment is 
necessary. Education, as the key to desirable jobs, can be crucial 
to allowing severely handicapped persons to break old barriers. By 
barring preadmission inquiry and requiring equally effective treat-
ment for handicapped students, the HEW Regulation thus arguably 
effectuates the congressional purpose of allowing all handicapped 
students to achieve their full intellectual and economic potentials. 
108 See, e.g., Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 
978 (W.D. Wis. 1968), afj'd, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969). But see Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 
U .s. 564 (1972). 
109 Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). 
Ho 414 U.S. at 569. See notes 86-90 and accompanying text supra. 
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